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CONTRACTS-SALES
Edwdrd J. Benett*
Professor Benett has selected several Illinois contracts cases which illustrate the wide-ranging development of Illinois contracts law over the past
year. He analyzes cases demonstrating the courts' protectionist attitude
toward the consuming public when dealing with warranty clauses, insurance contracts, contracts executed by minors, illegality, and the quasicontract remedy, in contrast to a less protectionist attitude in exculpatory
clause and Retail Installment Sales Act cases. He also reviews the many
cases in which the courts strictly construe contractual terms, such as clauses
attempting to foreclose the impossibility defense, covenants not to sue, and
terms specifying what constitutes an offer-acceptance, thus imparting a
caveat to attorneys drafting contracts.
INTRODUCTION

HE

past year was extremely active for the law of contracts and

sales in Illinois.' Thirty-five cases have been selected for comment in this survey article and they represent only one-half of all
the cases dealing with significant contract and sales issues. This survey indicates that Illinois courts are resolving many cases on the basis
of language interpretation and an application of a wide range of contractual remedies. Such vintage topics as the statute of frauds and

the parol evidence rule are also very much alive-even the old "mail
box rule" of offer and acceptance was resurrected for one case.

Illinois courts revealed an inclination to favor exculpatory clauses in
contracts while evidencing disfavor with arguments by insurance
companies to avoid paying on policies. In the sales area, the courts
demonstrated a much greater understanding of the Uniform Com-

mercial Code (UCC) than they have in past years, and exhibited a
genuine concern for consumers.

The UCC and out-of-state author-

ity were employed to relieve a used car buyer who bought the alltime "lemon" of a car; the doctrine of impossibility was invoked to
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. "The past year" includes cases from Volumes 6-12 of the Illinois Appellate
Reports (Third Series) Volumes 51-54 of the Illinois Supreme Court Reporter (Second Series) and from volumes 286-297 of the Northeastern Reports (Second Series).
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enable a dance student to rescind contracts for over $24,000 worth
of dance lessons; and the concept of implied disaffirmance was used
to remove a judgment against a minor car purchaser.
All but five of the cases that fall within the scope of this survey
are from Illinois Appellate Courts. Of those five, four are Illinois
Supreme Court decisions and one is a federal diversity case from the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. With six opinions, the Fifth
Division of the First District is the Illinois Appellate Court represented most in the survey. The other four divisions of that District account for thirteen cases and the remaining eleven cases are
from the Second through Fifth Districts (two from the Second, four
from the Third, three from the Fourth and two from the Fifth).
Judge Lorenz of the First District's Fifth Division is the most frequently cited opinion writer and four of his opinions were selected
for the survey. Judge Burman of the First District's Fourth Division and Judge Simkins of the Fourth District each have three opinions mentioned. Only two of the thirty-five cases selected contain
dissents: one by Judge Burman and the other by Supreme Court
Justice Goldenhersh. Three cases indicated the appearance of legal
aid attorneys and one was handled pro se.
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES ENFORCED

The exculpatory clause, a device by which a person attempts to
insulate himself from future lawsuits, has come under strenuous attack in courts of other jurisdictions. The clauses have not been
enforced for a variety of reasons; first, because they are usually
foisted on persons who have very little bargaining power; 2 second,
because they are not conspicuously pointed out to the persons accepting them in contracts; 8 third, because they are phrased in complex language which is not usually understood by persons without
legal training;4 and finally, because the clauses are not made a part
2. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) and Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1954),
and Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629' (1943).
3. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Mellinkoff, How to Make Contracts Illegible, 5 STAN. L. REv.
418 (1953).
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of the contract terms.' Despite these arguments, the Illinois courts
have given exculpatory clauses much more favorable treatment:
they have been enforced even in the face of legislative pronouncements to the contrary.' During the past year, exculpatory clauses
were brought to the Illinois appellate courts' attention on three separate occasions, each involving a different kind of contract. On all
three occasions, the courts ruled the exculpatory clause valid. Bruno
v. Gabhauer7 involved an exculpatory clause in a residential lease,
one of the most common uses of such a clause. The plaintifflessee alleged that he fell over an iron grate and suffered injuries
due to the defendant's negligence in maintaining the grate. The
defendant relied solely on a clause in the lease which read: "Lessor
shall not be liable to Lessee for any damage or injury . . . occasioned by the failure of Lessor to keep said premises in repair.
The court acknowledged that the Illinois legislature had
S. .,
passed a statute in 1969 making exculpatory clauses in leases void,
but also pointed out that such statute was found unconstitutional
a year later because of the exclusions granted in the statute to municipal corporations and governmental units.' The court admitted
that the constitutional defect in the original statute was corrected in
1971 by legislative action, 10 but insisted that such efforts could not
operate retroactively to cover the facts in Bruno. The court also
refused to look to other states for guidance in determining Illinois'
public policy on the matter. "As applied to contracts," noted Judge
English, "the constitution, statutes, and decisions of the state courts
are the proper sources of Illinois public policy, and this court can5.

See, e.g., Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 61

N.Y.S.2d 285 (1946).

6. In 1959 the Illinois legislature passed a statute making exculpatory clauses
in certain types of leases void as against public policy. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80,
§ 15a (1959).

Yet ten years later, the Illinois Supreme Court found a way to en-

force an exculpatory clause covered by the statute.

See Sweeney Gasoline & Oil

Co. v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 265, 247 N.E.2d 603 (1969).

The

legislature attempted to cure the defects in the original statute and in 1971 put into
effect another statute against exculpatory clauses in leases.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch.

80, § 91 (1971).
7.

9 Ill. App. 3d 345, 292 N.E.2d 238 (1972).

8. Id. at 346, 292 N.E.2d at 240.
9. See Sweeney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, P. & W.R. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 265,
247 N.E.2d 603 (1969).
10.

See note 6, supra.
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not look elsewhere in determining its existence and applicability to
the question before us."'"
Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Assn 1 2 involved exculpatory language appearing in the license application and sign-in sheets
signed by the plaintiff, a race car driver, prior to his participation
in races sanctioned by the defendant racing association. The language read, in part:
In consideration of the acceptance by A.C.R.A., Inc. of my license appli-

cation and issuance of license, . . I do hereby release, remise and forever
discharge A.C.R.A., Inc. . . from all liability, claims, actions and possible cause of action, whatsoever that may accrue to me or to my heirs,

• . .from every and any loss, damage and injury (including death) that
may be sustained by my person and property while in, about, en route

into and out of premises, where A.C.R.A., Inc. sanctioned races or other
3
events are presented.'

Although the trial court disregarded the exculpatory clause and rendered a judgment of $55,000 in the plaintiff's favor, 4 the First
District, Third Division Appellate Court found the clause valid and
reversed in the defendant's favor. Judge McGloon, speaking for the
court, passed over the fact that the plaintiff had never before participated in professional racing and thus had never before been
asked to agree to such a release.' 5 He also ignored the testimony
from the plaintiff and two other drivers that the exculpatory language on the sign-in sheets at the track had been folded under and
attached to a clipboard so that it could not be easily seen.' 6 "The
question of whether exculpatory agreements are against public policy calls into conflict two tenets of the law," wrote Judge McGloon.17 "First, a party should be liable for the negligent breach
of a duty which he lawfully owes to another; and second, a party
should be able to freely contract about his affairs."'" After noting
11.

9 Il1. App. 3d at 347, 292 N.E.2d at 240.

12. 8 Ill. App. 3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30 (1972).
13. Id. at 683, 291 N.E.2d at 31.
14. Id. at 682, 291 N.E.2d at 31.
15. 8 I11.
App. 3d at 683, 291 N.E.2d at 31. Such a fact has been determinative
in decisions of other courts. Compare Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198,
484 P.2d 405 (1971)

with Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.

1972).
16. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 683, 291 N.E.2d at 31.
17. Id. at 684-85, 291 N.E.2d at 32.
18.

Id.
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that Illinois favors the former tenet only for certain types of contractual relationships-such as that of a carrier-passenger, employeremployee and innkeeper-guest-the judge concluded that there is
nothing about the relationship between a race promoter and a driver
that would warrant making it another special category.
Therefore, we hold that an agreement between a participant in and a promoter of a stock car race, whereby the former assumes the risk of participating and releases the latter from claims due to the latter's negligence,
is not void as against the public policy of this state. 19

The third case involving an exculpatory clause was Bers v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,2 0 where a health club customer sued for
injuries sustained on the club's premises and the defendant health
club relied solely upon the exculpatory language contained in the
contract the customer had signed.
The lower court rendered a judgment on the pleadings for defendant, and the Second
Division of the First District Appellate Court affirmed, holding that
such a clause which released the health club from all liability for
injuries suffered on its premises was not void as against public policy. 2' The decision may be explained by the deficiency in plaintiff's presentation of the case as well as by the court's special fondness for exculpatory clauses. The court suggested that a disparity of bargaining power may have existed at the time the contract was signed, but that such information could not have been
considered on appeal since it was not included in the pleadings. 22
SALES:

CONSUMERS

CASES

When the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act was passed in
1965,2 3 it appeared to give consumers a significant weapon against
overzealous sellers. It required sellers to give clear and conspicuous
19. Id. at 686, 291 N.E.2d at 33. Other cases reaching the same conclusion
about race drivers and promoters are: Hine v. Dayton Speedway Corp., 20 Ohio
App. 2d 185, 252 N.E.2d 648 (1969); French v. Special Services, Inc., 107 Ohio
App. 435, 159 N.E.2d 785 (1958); and Corpus Christi Speedway v. Morton, 279
S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
20. - Ill. App. 3d -, 297 N.E.2d 360 (1973).
21. Id. at-, 297 N.E.2d at 360.
22. Id.
23. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 , §§ 223 et seq., (1965), as amended, ILL. REv.
STAT., ch. 121 , §§ 501 et seq. (1967).
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notice of buyers' rights and obligations,2 4 as well as a breakdown of
the sales price, finance charges and other costs inherent in an installment purchase. 25 It also compelled the use of certain form language on all installment sales contracts. 2 61 One shortcoming of the

Act was its limited statement of buyers' remedies for a seller's
breach of his statutory duties. Though it gave buyers the right to
avoid paying finance charges if the Act were violated by sellers,2 7
it did not indicate whether such recourse was to be the buyers' ex-

clusive civil remedy.
In 1971, an attorney for Chicago's Legal Aid Bureau argued in
the First District Appellate Court that an aggrieved buyer had the
right to cancel his contract since the seller's violation of the statute

made the contract illegal. 28

The plaintiff, Joseph Spencer, had en-

tered into a retail installment contract with the defendant, Anco In-

vestment Corporation, using a document which did not contain the
seller's signature nor the words "retail installment contract," the requisite "notice to buyer" or other information required by statute.
The appellate court agreed that the contract did not comply with
the Retail Installment Sales Act, but restricted the buyer's remedy

to a recovery of finance charges. This year, the case was brought
to the Illinois Supreme Court, where the decision was affirmed for
the seller.29 Justice Kluczynski wrote:
It is clear from the language of the . . . act . . . that the buyer's remedy
is exclusive. To hold otherwise and render the contract void for noncompliance would negate the effect of section 17 because there would be
80
no contract upon which this provision could be enforced.
24. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1212, § 224, 227 (1965), as amended, ch. 121 1h,
§ 504 (1967).
25. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 1211/2, § 225 (1965), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 1212, § 505 (1967).
26. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 224 (1965), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121/2, § 503 (1967).
27. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 240 (1965), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121% § 531(b) (1967).
28. See Anco Investment Corp. v. Spencer, 1 Ill. App. 3d 445, 275 N.E.2d 263
(1971). For a discussion of the case, see also Benett, Contracts-Sales,Survey of
Illinois Law 1971-72, 22 DEPAUL L. RE.v. 156, 170 (1972).
29. Anco Investment Corp. v. Spencer, 53 Il1. 2d 396, 292 N.E.2d 726 (1973).
30. Id. at 398, 292 N.E.2d at 727. The section 17 to which the court refers to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 240 (1965) as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 121%,
§ 531(b) (1967).
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The practical effect of the decision is that sellers hardly need to
worry any longer over violations of the Retail Installment Sales Act
since the civil repercussions are mild, if indeed they are ever sought
by the victimized buyers. The criminal penalties provided in the
Act3 ' are also not a strong deterrent because the State's Attorney and
Attorney General's offices very seldom enforce them.
A more encouraging case for consumers, however, is Overland
Bond and Investment Corp. v. Howard,3 2 where the Appellate Court
for the First District, Fifth Division rendered the most comprehensive
application of the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty provisions
since the UCC was adopted in this state in 1962.8 The appellant,
Howard, purchased a used car from Car Credit Corporation and
signed a retail installment contract which acknowledged his acceptance of the car in good condition and included a standard "integration" clause:
This contract contains all of the agreements of the parties relative to the
retail installment sale, and no representations, promises, statements or
warranties, express or implied, have been made by seller unless contained
34
herein or imposed by law.

Howard informed the dealer at the time of the purchase that he
was a salesman and that he needed the daily use of a car for his job.
The day after the purchase of the car, its transmission fell out onto
the Eisenhower Expressway. Howard returned the car to the dealer,
who repaired the transmission nine days later. Then the gas line
clogged and had to be fixed. A week after that, the brakes failed
on the Dan Ryan Expressway and the car was again returned to the
dealer for repairs. Three weeks went by, and despite daily inquiries
by Howard, no further work was done on the car. At that time,
Howard informed two salesmen and the credit manager that he
was cancelling the contract. The plaintiff, Overland, who was the
assignee of the installment contract, resold the automobile at an auction for $500 and sued Howard for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the car.
31. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 243 (1965), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 , § 531 (a) (1973): "(a) Any person who knowingly violates this Act
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."
32. 9 111. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972).
33. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 (1971).
34. § Ill. App. 3d at 355, 292 N.E.2d at 173.
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The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered an order confirming judgment by confession against Howard. On appeal, the Northwest Neighborhood Legal Services office of Chicago's Legal As-

sistance Foundation filed an impressive brief, citing the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 5 sections of the Uniform Commercial Code,36
and extensive case law from Illinois and other jurisdictions. The
appellate court, in an opinion by Judge English, adopted the appel-

lant's position in its entirety, and in so doing, made five significant
conclusions. First, the court concluded that the warranty of merchantability applies as much to a used car as to a new one. The
official comment to section 2-31411 left doubt on this point. Relying on case law from Connecticut 38 and Washington, 9 Judge English stated
Fitness for the ordinary purpose of driving implies that the vehicle should
be in a safe condition and substantially free of defects. It should be obvious that any car without an adequate transmission and proper brakes is
not fit for the ordinary purpose of driving. Any other conclusion would
entitle unscrupulous sellers to foist inherently dangerous and potentially
worthless vehicles on unwary consumers and thereby avoid the obvious in40
tent of the statute.

Second, the court found that because Howard had informed the car
dealer he was a salesman who needed a car for business purposes,

a second warranty, that of fitness for a particular purpose, was created. 41 All four requisites for the warranty were found in the trial
record: 1) the buyer's communication of his purpose to seller; 2)
the seller's use of his skill and judgment in helping the buyer select
a product to meet his stated purpose; 3) the buyer's reliance on the
35. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1212, § 262L (1969) (this provision remains unchanged in the 1971 Code).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §8 2-314, 2-315, 2-316(2) and (3), 2-607(3)(a),
and 2-608 (1971).
37. "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves only such
obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-314 (Smith-Hurd 1963) (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-314, Comment 3).
38. Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42
(1967).
39. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971).
40. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 354, 292 N.E.2d at 172-73.
41. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-315 (1969) (this provision: remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
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seller's skill and judgment, and 4) the seller's knowledge of the buy-

er's reliance.
The court's third conclusion was that all the attempted disclaim-

ers in the contract were ineffective because they were put in fine
print in an inconspicuous location on the writing and were not
phrased in language required by statute.4 2

"[T]o exclude an im-

plied warranty of merchantability," stated the court, "the language
used must mention merchantability and be conspicuous. No such
language appears in the present contract even among [SIC] the fine
print. . . -43 Though conceding that implied warranties might
also be excluded if the contract states "buyer acknowledges delivery,
examination and acceptance of said car in its present condition," the
court found that the actual language used in the contract at issue-

"buyer acknowledges delivery and acceptance of said motor vehicle
in good condition"-was significantly different and thus, did not

act as a disclaimer of warranties.
The term, "present condition," we agree, is like "as is" and "with all
faults," since those terms make no direct assertion that the vehicle is
qualitatively either good or bad, but, instead, imply a warning to the buyer
that he may be purchasing a car in its present condition with whatever
faults it may possess. On the other hand, to state that a vehicle is in
"good condition" at the time of delivery does not, in our opinion, call
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of any warranties, but simply seeks
44
to reassure the buyer that the car he is purchasing is a "good" one.

Fourth, the court found that no particular words or method were
required to make an adequate notice of a warranty breach under
42. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(2) and (3)(a) (1969) (this provision
remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
43. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 292 N.E.2d at 174. The court is referring to UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2):
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify
any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
44. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 292 N.E.2d at 174, referring to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE

§ 2-316(3)(a):

unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, allimplied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty. . ..
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section 2-607(3)(a). 45 Having the car towed to the dealer's place
of business and informing the dealer's employees that the car was
in need of repair constituted sufficient notice to the dealer that the

implied warranties had been breached. While buyers in the past
have found themselves unable to assert breaches of warranties because of their failure to comply with the Code's notice requirement,

Howard may remove this barrier with its lessening of formality in
giving notice.
Finally, the court found that Howard had retained the right to

revoke his acceptance of the car and get his money back several
weeks after the date of purchase.4 6 Attempts to utilize section 2-608
have often failed in the past because buyers were unable to prove
that a non-conformity in the goods substantially impaired the value
of the goods or because buyers could not show that they gave the
sellers an opportunity to cure the non-conformity.
From the facts of this case, there can be little doubt that defendants' car,
after having had the transmission fall out, and then experiencing a complete failure of the brakes (both dangerous occurrences while defendant
was travelling on an expressway), was so hazardous to drive that the value
of defendants' contract for the car was substantially impaired. A consideration of the different defects and their substantial effect on defendants' car leads us to conclude that the revocation was entirely proper and
justified since the buyers received unfulfilled assurances that the defects
would be cured and also because of the practical impossibility of initial
discovery of the defects by the buyers. 47

Consumer-oriented attorneys who might regard Howard as the
start of a trend toward consumerism in Illinois courts should temper
45.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(a)

reads:

"Where a tender has

been accepted the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy . . ." [emphasis added].
46.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608 entitled "Revocation of Acceptance,"

reads:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has
accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without discovery of
such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before
any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by
their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of
it.
47. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 292 N.E.2d at 177.
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their enthusiasm with the realization that the equities of the case
were glaringly in favor of the buyer and the fact that appellee,

Overland, failed to file a brief or even put in an appearance in the
appellate court.4 8 Nevertheless, it is still encouraging to see that a
well-researched and well-written brief, as was presented by attor-

neys for Howard, is still an effective way to make law in Illinois.
SALES:

NON-CONSUMER CASES

The facts in Oloffson v. Coomer,4 9 decided this year by the Third
District Court of Appeals, provide an excellent illustration of the
application of the UCC's sections on anticipatory repudiation and
computation of damages. The plaintiff, Oloffson, was a grain dealer
and the defendant, Coomer, was a farmer.50 In April, 1970, they
entered into a contract for 40,000 bushels of corn, 20,000 to be
delivered by Coomer by October 30 and 20,000 to be delivered by
December 15, 1970. On June 3 of that year, Coomer informed

Oloffson that he was not going to plant corn because the season
had been too wet, and that Oloffson would have to buy his corn
elsewhere. Oloffson refused to take Coomer's suggestion, and for
several months thereafter attempted to get Coomer to deliver the
corn as promised. Finally, he gave up and decided to purchase
the corn elsewhere at a price much higher than either the contract
price or the June 3 market price. The price of corn stated in the
April contract was $1.12 a bushel while the market price on June
48. The appellants moved for a default judgement against the appellee for the
latter's failure to appear in the appellate court, but rather than granting a pro forma
reversal, the court chose to consider the merits of the appeal. Its authority for
doing so was Daley v. Jack's Tivoli Liquor Lounge, Inc., 118 I1. App. 2d 264,
254 N.E.2d 814 (1969).
49. 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973).
50. An important issue in the case was whether the defendant, Coomer, a
farmer, could be considered a "merchant" under the UCC definition for that word.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1) states:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind, or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.
The court concluded that Coomer was not a "merchant" within this definition
because he "was simply in the business of growing rather than merchandising grain."
11 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 296 N.E.2d at 873.
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3, when Coomer said he would not deliver, was $1.16. The average
price actually paid by Oloffson was $1.42 a bushel.
At the trial Oloffson was awarded damages based on the difference between the contract price and the June 3 market price. On
appeal, Oloffson contended that the proper measure of damages was
the difference between the contract price and the market prices for
corn on the dates Coomer was supposed to make his deliveries. The
difference of opinion between the trial court and Oloffson amounted
to about $20,000. Judge Alloy of the appellate court made the
primary finding that Coomer's June 3 statement was an anticipatory
repudiation of the contract pursuant to section 2-610 of the UCC.5"
This conclusion meant that Oloffson, as the "aggrieved party," had
two alternatives. He could either await performance by the
repudiating party for a commercially reasonable time or he could
resort to any remedy for breach provided for in another section of
the Code. 52 However, the court gave such a restrictive construction
to "commercially reasonable time" that it effectively eliminated the
first alternative. The "'commercially reasonable time'," stated the
court, "expired on June 3, 1970"-the same day Coomer made his
repudiation. 3 Thus, Oloffson's options were limited to the remedies
delineated in section 2-711 of the Code.54 That section again provided him with two alternatives: either he could "cover" under section 2-712,' 5 i.e., arrange to buy the corn elsewhere on June 3 and
51. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-610 (1961) (this provision remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
52. A list of buyer's remedies is contained in § 2-711, and according to § 2-610,
a buyer confronted with an anticipatory breach has all of the options of § 2-711
open to him.
53. 11 111. App. 3d at 921, 296 N.E.2d at 874. The court explained:
Since Coomer's statement to Oloffson on June 3, 1970, was unequivocal
and since "cover" easily and immediately was available to Oloffson in
the well-organized and easily accessible market for purchases of grain to be
delivered in the future, it would be unreasonable for Oloffson on June 3,
1970, to have awaited Coomer's performance rather than to have proceeded under Section 2-610(b) and, thereunder, to elect then to treat the
repudiation as a breach. Therefore, if Oloffson were relying on his right
to effect cover under section 2-711(1)(a), June 3, 1970, might for the
foregoing reason alone have been the day on which he acquired cover.
11 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 296 N.E.2d at 874.
54. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610(b) on anticipatory repudiation refers
to two other sections-2-703 and 2-711-but 2-711 is the only one applying in this
case because the buyer is the aggrieved party. Section 2-703 deals with the
seller's remedies when the buyer has repudiated.
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712 states, in part:
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then recover the difference between the cost of purchase and the

contract price, or he could sue Coomer under section 2-713", for
the difference between the market price for corn on June 3 and
the contract price. Under either of these alternatives, damages
would add up to the same figure-the same sum which the lower
court actually awarded to Oloffson.5 7 Oloffson's mistake, then, was
waiting several months after the June 3 repudiation to arrange for
a substitute corn purchase; he should have acted immeditately on
June 3.1 s Although the case does not produce any novel results,

it is useful in showing the workings and inter-relationship of various
UCC sections and provides an object lesson for those who wish to
keep all their options open in anticipatory breach situations in sales

contracts.
In Weiss v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co.,5 9 Judge Egan of the
First District, First Division Appellate Court, described the necessary

ingredients for an express warranty under section 2-313 of the
Code60 and then went on to give three reasons why no such warranties were made. The plaintiff, Weiss, contended that a statement
made by one of the defendants, Ness, about the operation of an

electrical wood shaping machine was a warranty, the breach of
which caused him to injure his hand severely. The court's first rea(1) After a breach . . . the buyer may "cover" by making in good faith
and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller. (2) The
buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages ... , but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach.
56. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-713 states in part:
(1) . . . the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the
seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages ... , but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
57. The appellate court concluded that the $1,500 judgment in Coomer's favor
was all that he was entitled to. 11 111. App. 3d at 923, 296 N.E.2d at 875.
58. The court also indicated that Oloffson was in bad faith on June 3, 1970
when he failed to point out to Coomer the usage of trade permitting his customers
to cancel grain contracts and pay the difference between the contract price and
market price on the day of cancellation. 11 111. App. 3d at 922-23, 296 N.E.2d at
874-75.
59. 9 Ill. App. 3d 906, 293 N.E.2d 375 (1973).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-313 (1961) (this provision remains unchanged
in the 1971 code).
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son for rejecting Weiss' argument was that the defendant's language

was not an affirmation of fact or a promise, as required by section
2-313, but rather a personal opinion." 1
To determine whether or not there is a warranty, the decisive test is
whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant,
or merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the vendor
has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also
to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment. In the former case there
62
is a warranty and in the latter there is not.

Further, the court found that the defendant Ness did not assert a
fact of which Weiss was ignorant. Both parties could readily see
the danger of the device in operation and Ness merely had said there
would be no worry of getting hurt if the machine was used properly.63 Finally, Weiss failed to prove that Ness' statement was false.
The language about there being no worry of injury was conditioned
on the board being "tight against the fence," but at the time of
injury, the board was not tight against the fence. The most surprising aspect of the case, however, is the fact that the court even considered the possibility of an express warranty under section 2-313 since
the facts show that Weiss was not a person entitled to such warranty
protection in Illinois. Illinois code section 2-31864 extends warranty
protection only to buyers, family or household members of the
buyer, and house guests of the buyer-not to employees of buyers.
The wood shaper was purchased by Weiss' employer, not by Weiss,
but the court failed to mention this point. Weiss, however, can
still be helpful to show the overlapping of warranties in sales law
with products liability in tort law. Two other counts in Weiss' com61. 9 Il. App. 3d at 915, 293 N.E.2d at 381.
62. Id. The court quoted from Keller v. Flynn, 346 Il1. App. 499, 508, 105
N.E.2d 532, 536 (1952).
63. Moreover, the vendor here certainly did not assert a fact of which the
buyer was ignorant. Ness was not possessed of any special knowledge.
The same observations made with reference to the duty to warn are appropriate here. The vendor and vendee could both see the danger of the
device in operation that the blades cut from the underside, and that
pressure was required to hold the board down and against the cutter.
9 Ill. App. 3d at 915, 293 N.E.2d at 381.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-318 (1970):
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. ...
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plaint were based on a products liability theory, but they were rejected by the court as well.
Another case reflecting an overlap of the UCC and tort law
was Best Bearings, Inc. v. Challenger Parts Rebuilders, Inc.,6" a
case heard this year by the Second District Appellate Court. The
buyer of ball bearings and other automotive equipment initially
brought an action against the seller based on breach of the express
and implied warranties of title.6" The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to bring the action
within four years of the date of the alleged breach, as required by
section 2-725 of the Code. 67 The plaintiff then sought to file an
amended complaint in which he alleged the same facts, but as part
of an action of fraud rather than breach of warranty. The appellate
court permitted the action to proceed in tort because it was now
within the five year statute of limitations for fraud. 8
IMPOSSIBILITY AND FRAUD INDANCE CONTRACTS

Three years ago, a dance student tried to rescind a contract with
Arthur Murray's dance studio because an alleged physical disability
made it impossible for him to continue his lessons. 9 The First District, First Division Appellate Court thwarted his efforts because the
trial record did not sufficiently evince the alleged disability. The
court, however, left the door open for future litigants in the student's
position by endorsing two sections of the Restatement of Contracts
on the doctrine of impossibility.7 ° Seizing on that court's dictum,
65. 10111. App. 3d 404, 294 N.E.2d 118 (1973).
66. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-312 (1969) (this provision remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725(1)(2) (1969) (this provision remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (1969).
69. See Davies v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 2d 141, 260 N.E.2d 240
(1970).
70. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 459 (1932):

A duty that requires for its performance action that can be rendered only
by the promisor or
death or such illness
seriously injurious to
intention or there is

some other particular person is discharged by his
as makes the necessary action by him impossible or
his health, unless the contract indicates a contrary
contributing fault on the part of the person subject

to the duty.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 460 (1932):

(1) Where the existence of a specific thing or person is, either by the
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another dance student of Arthur Murray, Inc. this year put forth
the same impossibility argument in an effort to rescind a series of
five contracts obligating him for $24,812.80.71 This time, the plaintiff presented the court with ample evidence from both lay and expert
witnesses as to his disability which resulted from an auto accident.
The defendant studio this time pointed to clauses which had been
added to its contracts since the time of the previous case. These
clauses, printed in bold face capital lettering, read: "NON-CANCELLABLE NEGOTIABLE CONTRACT" and "I UNDERSTAND THAT NO REFUNDS WILL BE MADE UNDER THE
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT." The defendant studio contended
the clauses manifested a mutual intent by the parties to foreclose
any possible application of the doctrine of impossibility.
While recognizing the extant right to waive that doctrine,7 2 the
court held that the particular language referred to by the defendant
failed to accomplish this purpose. "An ambiguous contract will be
construed most strongly against the party who drafted it," reasoned
the court in an opinion by Judge Stamos.7 3 "Although neither party
to a contract should be relieved from performance on the ground
that good business judgment was lacking, a court will not place upon
language a ridiculous construction. ' 74 In addition to praying for
and getting his money back, the plaintiff sought punitive damages
against the studio based on fraud. He conteded he was fraudulently
induced to sign the contracts by representations that he had "exceptional potential to be a fine and accomplished dancer" and that he
was a "natural born dancer." The court took into account the business relationship between the parties and the educational background of the plaintiff, who had attended college, in rejecting this
part of the complaint.
terms of the bargain or in the contemplation of both parties, necessary for

the performance of a promise in the bargain, a duty to perform the promise
• . . is discharged if the thing or person subsequently is not in existence in

time for reasonable performance, unless a contrary intention is manifested, or the contributing fault of the promisor causes the nonexistence.
App. 3d 1000, 295 N.E.2d 487 (1973).
71. Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 10 Ill.
72. Both sections of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS to which the court
referred-sections 459 and 460-contain language that permits parties to make the
doctrine of impossibility inoperative if they so agree. See note 70 supra.
73. 10 Ill.
App. 3d at 1003, 295 N.E.2d at 490. Judge Stamos was writing for

the First District, Second Division of the Appellate Court.
74.

Id.
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Generally a mere expression of opinion could not support an action for
fraud. [citation omitted] In addition, misrepresentations, in order to
constitute actionable fraud, must pertain to present or pre-existing facts,
75
rather than to future or contingent events, expectations or probabilities.

Though the case probably will remain significant for its discussion
of impossibility and fraud, it will lose its importance in resolving
dance contract disputes because in 1965 the Illinois legislature
passed a bill regulating such contracts. 78
STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

It is astounding to see that after centuries of litigation, the statute
of frauds and parol evidence rule remain a vital area of litigation
in contract cases. As is usually the case, the Illinois courts during
the past year applied the exceptions to the two rules more than the
rules themselves. In Mercer v. Sturm, 7 7 the plaintiffs tried to force
the defendant to honor a verbal agreeement he made allowing the
construction and use of a driveway on his property. The plaintiffs
had performed their part of the bargain by constructing and grading
the driveway while the defendant merely stood by without objection.
Only after the plaintiffs completed their performance did the defendant question the validity of the agreement, raising the statute of
frauds as his defense. The court found that the plaintiffs' performance under the contract was sufficient to take the case out of the
statute and to bind defendant to his oral promise. "It would be
a fraud in this case," noted the court, "to permit the defendant to
annul his agreement by invoking the statute of frauds. 78
In Stein v. Malden Mills, Inc.,79 a salesman sued his former em75. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 1004, 295 N.E.2d at 490. The "opinions" the court
found included statements by defendant to plaintiff that plaintiff had "exceptional
potential to be a fine and accomplished dancer," that he had "exceptional potential"
and that he was a "natural born dancer" and a "terrific dancer."
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, §§ 51, 52 (1965), dealing with the regulation of
contracts involving both health and dance studios. Section 52 reads: "Any contract for health or dance studio services which does not comply with the applicable
provisions of this act shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."
(This language remains unchanged in the 1971 code).
77. 10 Ill. App. 3d 65, 293 N.E.2d 457 (1973), decided by the Third District
Appellate Court.
App. 3d at 68, 293 N.E.2d at 460. The Illinois statute requiring
78. 10 Ill.
contracts involving land to be in writing is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 2 (1971).
App. 3d 266, 292 N.E.2d 52 (1972), decided by the First District,
79. 9 Ill.
Fifth Division of the Appellate Court.
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ployer for breach of an oral contract under which he was to receive
commissions on reorder sales even after termination of his employment. The defendant contended that the contract was violative of
the one year provision of the Illinois statute of frauds 0 since the
commissions could have been payable to the plaintiff for a period
far longer than a year after the oral contract was made. In fact,
commissions were paid to plaintiff long beyond the one year period.
The court rejected the argument and applied the same reasoning
that courts have been applying for the past half-century:,
mhe test to determine whether such agreement comes within the statute
is not whether it was performed within a year, but whether, when the,
agreement was made, it could have been performed within a year; and if so,.
.
it does not come within the statute.81

The court noted that even though the agreement called for payment
of commissions as long as the customers reordered, and that those
reorders foreseeably could have come in forever, it was just as possible that reorders could have stopped before the end of one year,
or that the plaintiff could have died before the end of the first.year
after making the contract.82 In light of the wide acceptance, of the
"performable" interpretation of the one year rule, it is awonder
why defense counsel even argued this issue.
The one case where the statute' of frauds was used to prevent
the proof of a contracct was Lee v. Central National Bank & Trusf

Co.," and ironically it was a case where a writing signed by the
proper party actually existed. The problem was that it came into
existence too late. Prior to their marriage, Olive and Orin Cox
made a verbal agreement in which each disclaimed any interest .in
any property owned by the other. This agreement was later recog80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 1 (1971), which reads in part:
no action shall be brought . . . upon any agreement that is not to be
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the
promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party
to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized.
81. 9 I1. App. 3d at 271-72, 292 N.E.2d at 57, quoting Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 242 Ore. 407, 413, 408 P.2d 198, 201 (1965).

82.

Some courts have not equated the possibility of the performer's death within

a year with "completed performance"

of the

Kouchoucos, 161 Tex. 299, 340 S.W.2d 27 (1960).
83. 11111. App. 3d 60, 296 N.E.2d 81 (1973).

contract.

See e.g.,

Gilliam v.
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nized in a written agreement exectued by them after their marriage.
When Olive died, representatives of Orin wanted the agreement set
aside, and the question raised was whether an antenuptial agreement,
reduced to writing after marriage, was violative of the Illinois statute
of frauds."4 The Second District Appellate Court, relying on a case.
decided in 1887,85 held that it was. Interestingly, the statute nowhere specifies at what point in time the requisite writing must come
into existence, but he court overlooked this point.
In two cases where attorneys attempted to introduce evidence not,

contained in written documents, they were permitted to do so be-.
cause of exceptions to the parol evidence rule. In Haas v. Cohen"'
the plaintiffs were real estate brokers who listed for sale property
owned by the defendants Cohen and Muzzy. Cohen signed the listing agreement, a document complete and unambiguous on its face;
but co-owner Muzzy did not sign it. Later, the plaintiffs found
a prospective purchaser and submitted a written offer to the'defendants. Again, Cohen signed but Muzzy did not. When the deal
was ready to be closed, both defendants refused to perform, arguing

that the second owner's signature was a condition precedent to any
contract-an event which never materialized. The plaintiffs objected
to any testimony which tended to prove such condition, but the trial
court overruled the objection and held for Cohen and Muzzy.

In affirming the ruling, the Third District Appellate Court stated:
Ordinarily parol evidence is not admissible to vary, alter or contradict
the terms of a written contract, which also would include a situation
where a condition which is not provided for in the contract is imposed by
parol. . . . If, however, parol evidence is offered to show that a contract
was intended to take effect only upon compliance with a certain condition
87
it is admissible.

It is easy to see how such a rule might be abused, since some parties
84. Although the court does not cite the specific part of the Illinois statute of
frauds it felt was applicable to the case, it apparently felt the case was covered by
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 1 (1971) which reads, in part:
no action shall be brought . . . to charge any person upon any agreement
made upon consideration of marriage, . . . unless the promise or agreement

upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized;
85. McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, 120 Ill. 26, 11 N.E. 397 (1887).86. 10 111. App. 3d 896, 295 N.E.2d 28 (1973).
87. Id. at 898-99, 295 N.E.2d at 30.
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may be tempted to introduce evidence of fictionalized conditions.
Perhaps it was in recognition of that very danger that the court
modified the lower court's decision by allowing only Muzzy, the nonsigning owner, to avoid liability for the broker's commission. Cohen,
however, was found liable.88
General Casualty Co. v. Elam 9 raised an interesting and unusual
parol evidence question: whether evidence which clearly would be
inadmissible when two contracting parties are involved in litigation
suddenly becomes admissible when a stranger to the contract is
involved in the suit. The Fifth District Appellate Court held in
the affirmative, although conceding that there was very little Illinois
authority on point. Relying on interpretations from other jurisdictions, notably Oregon, 90 Alabama, 91 and California," 2 the court
stated that parol evidence was admissible to contradict or vary the
terms of the insurance contract in question where one of the parties
to the suit was not a party to the contract. This exception to the
parol evidence rule apparently would apply even where the evidence
is not offered by the stranger, but by a party to the contract."8 The
rationale for the court's holding, or for the holding in any of the
cases cited by the court, was not given.
INTERPRETATION

Illinois courts resolved several important cases this past year by
rendering their own peculiar interpretations of contractual language.
They made it evident, for example, that a crucial difference exists
between a covenant not to sue and a release and they showed how
one word or one phrase-either added to or deleted from a contract
88. The court concluded that Muzzy and Cohen were co-owners of the property
and that one had a right to enter a listing agreement with a broker without the other.
"The fact that the seller may not be the sole owner of the property neither renders
the sales agreement unenforceable nor affects the seller's liability under the listing
agreement where the broker has performed according to its terms." 10 Ill. App. 3d
at 900, 295 N.E.2d at 32 (1973).
89. 8 II1. App. 3d 215, 289 N.E.2d 699 (1972).
90. Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Oregon 446, 450 P.2d 529 (1969) and Carolina
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Oregon 407, 408 P.2d 198 (1965).

91. Shelby County v. Baker, 110 S.2d 896 (Ala. 1963).
92. Kassianov v. Raisses, 200 Cal. App. 2d 573, 19 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1962).
93. This proposition was made in Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins.
Co., 242 Ore. 407, 413, 408 P.2d 198, 201 (1965).

s

19731

CONTRACTS-SALES

-can be made the focal point of an entire opinion. For attorneys
who draft contracts, these cases should be of particular interest.
In Edgar County Bank and Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc.94

a 17-month old baby was allegedly injured for life when he was
taken to the emergency room of defendant hospital and improperly
given a hypodermic needle in his buttocks. The shot allegedly damaged his sciatic nerve, causing a foot drop and resulting in his having
to wear a leg brace. Suit was filed against the doctor who administered the injection and the nurse who assisted him, as well as the
hospital which employed them. The boy's guardian first accepted
a $25,000 settlement of the claim against the doctor, and then decided to pursue its claim against the hospital on the theory of respondeat superior. The question was raised whether the execution of
a covenant not to sue the doctor operated to release the hospital.
The Fourth District Appellate Court, in an opinion written by Judge
Simkins, first noted that where the master's liability is vicarious, a
release of the employee by the injured party will release the employer
as well. However, he went on to say that a covenant not to sue
does not have the same legal effect as a release. Such covenant
has no effect on the liability of other wrongdoers not a party to
the covenant."5 Whether an instrument is a covenant or a release
depends, said the court, "upon the language used, the substance of
the agreement, and the intention of the parties."9 6 In ParisHospital,
the covenant language was repeatedly used in the settlement agreement and the document explicitly stated that no one but the doctor
was to be affected by it, and thus the court action against the hospital was allowed to proceed.
Interpretation of imprecise language in a post-nuptial settlement
was the issue in Richheimer v. Richheimer,97 a case heard by the

First District, Fifth Division. The settlement agreement, incorporated into a divorce decree, provided that the plaintiff was to receive
more than $2,000 a month for 121 months following a her remar94.
95.

10 Ill.
App. 3d 465, 294 N.E.2d 319 (1973).
Id. at 470, 294 N.E.2d at 323. The court relied on Chicago and A.R.R. Co.

v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 79 N.E. 654 (1906) and Aiken v. Insull, 122 F.2d 746
(7th Cir. 1941).
96. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 294 N.E.2d at 323, the court relied on A.P. Freund
Sons v. Vaupell, 30 Ill. App. 2d 271, 174 N.E.2d 882 (1961).
97. 9 Il.App. 3d 376, 292 N.E.2d 190 (1972).
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riage. She remarried, but the defendant failed to keep his promise
to make the payments, contending he could avoid them on the basis
of an Illinois statute. The statute reads:
A party shall not be entitled to alimony and maintenance after remarriage; but, regardless of remarriage by such party or death of either party,

such party shall be entitled to receive the unpaid installments of any settlement in lieu of alimony ordered to be paid or conveyed in the decree.98

It became crucial, then, whether the promised monthly payments
were to be regarded as periodic alimony, in which case they could
be stopped under the statute, or whether they were to be considered
as installments on a guaranteed lump sum settlement, in which case
the statute would mandate that they be continued.
The lower court accepted the former interpretation and refused to
admit evidence from plaintiff tending to prove the latter. The appellate court, in an opinion by Judge Lorentz, found the language in
the agreement to be charteristic of both periodic alimony and a lump
sum settlement. 99 On the one hand, the agreement referred at several points to the payments as "alimony" while on no occasion did
it give a gross sum figure to be paid. On the other hand, explicit
language that payments were to continue for a fixed period of time
following plaintiff's remarriage indicated an intent to have a gross
sum settlement. Furthermore, the agreement recited that it was to
be charged against the husband's estate in the event of his death,
another bit of support for the lump sum interpretation, since alimony
is limited to the life span of the husband. The appellate court could
only conclude that an ambiguity existed in the languge of the agreement and that the lower court should have admitted more evidence
to resolve the ambiguity. Thus, the, case was reversed and remanded.
A favorable interperation of the -word "condition" enabled a lessee
to break a lease in S & H Realty and Investment Co. v. Consumers

Budget Loan Co.,10 a case heard last year by the Fifth District
Appellate Court. , The lease was for office space in a building owned
by the plaintiff in East St. Louis, Illinois. One paragraph in the
98.

ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1969)

(this language remains unchanged

in the 1971 code).
99. 9 111. App. 3d at 379-80, 292 N.E.2d at 193.

100.

8 Il. App. 3d 206, 289 N.E.2d 696 (1972).
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lease gave the lessee the right to cancel upon ninety-day written noticeif
any law, decision, regulation
effectual in this City, State or
adversely affects or makes it
business in these premises. ....

or condition exists, continues or 'is made
Nation which in the judgment of the lessee
unprofitable for the lessee to carry on its
101

In cancelling the lease, the lessee took the word "condition" to mean

any economic or environmental circumstance which made his business unprofitable. There were several such circumstances: 1) the
loss of some $86,000 in receivables; 2) the Federal Reserve Bank's
increase in the prime interest rate; and 3) several armed robberies
which made customers reluctant to do business in the defendant's
locale.
The lessor, on the other hand, believed that the word "condition"

in the lease should have been subjected
tation, restricting it, through the rule
meaning of the, same general character
it in the lease, namely "law, decision

to a much narrower interpreof ejusdem generis,1°2 to a
as the three words preceding
and regulation." According

to the plaintiff's definition, the word condition would be limited to
an enactment or ruling of a governmental unit. The court accepted
defendant's position, stating, in an opinion by Judge Jones:
The words "law, decision, regulation" for all practical purposes exhaust
the genus of enactments or rulings of governmental units, and, therefore,
the general word "condition" must refer to some larger class. The maxim
ejusdem generis, thus must yield to another rule of construction of written contracts. "No word in a contract is to be treated as meaningless if
any meaning which is reasonable and consistent with other parts can be

given to

it."103

The court skimmed over the suggestion that a clause so heavily favorable to a lessee might make the entire lease illusory or lacking
in mutuality of obligation."
Even if it had dwelt on this point,
- 101. Id. at 207, 289 N.E.2d at 697.
102. It is a commonly applied rule of construction that when general words
follow particular words, the former can mean only things or persons of the Same
kind or class as those which are particularly mentioned. See Gage v. Cameron,
212 1!!. 146, 72 N.E. 204 (1904).
103. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 289 N.E.2d at 698.
104. The court stated:
It may be heavily favorable to the lessee, but that does not make it fail for
want of consideration or mutuality. The agreement was not illusory and
lacking in mutuality because both were bound, the lessor to provide certain
space, the lessee to pay certain rentals, the term is for a specific time unless
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however, the result of the case in favor of the lessee would have
been the same because the lessor would not have been able to enforce an illusory lease or one lacking mutuality.
The Illinois Supreme Court also found interpretation to be an
effective means of resolving contract disputes this past year. In Kadansky v. Fickett'0 5 the question raised was whether an attorney's
wording of a letter was sufficiently definite and unconditional in
order for it to operate as an exercise of an option on behalf of his
clients. The plaintiffs had paid $100 for an option to purchase
real estate and within the time limit of the option, they directed
their attorney to mail to the defendants' attorney the following letter:
Please be advised that my clients ... wish to exercise their option to purchase the property . . . pursuant to the terms of their Option Contract.
Mr. Kadansky has advised me that our clients have agreed in a general
way to method of payment which varies with that set out in the agreement.
Please let me know if this is correct. 106

The defendants refused to convey the property on the grounds that
the letter was not an unconditional exercise of the option. The circuit court held for the buyers. The First District Appellate Court,
First Division reversed on the basis that the letter did not exhibit
a present intent to exercise the option but merely a desire to exercise
it at some future time. 10 7 The supreme court, however, adopted
the circuit court's position, holding that the letter was sufficient to
exercise the option. Also, rather than viewing the second paragraph of the letter as a request for a change in payment terms, the
court interpreted it as a mere request for the defendants' attorney
to confirm or deny a report that the parties had agreed to payment
terms different from those in the original agreement. In calling to
mind the strictness usually associated with the interpretation of contracts, for the sale of land, one should consider the plaintiff's attorney extremely fortunate in obtaining this favorable result from the
supreme court. Still, the lesson to be learned is that even in letterdescribed circumstances made continuance unprofitable for the lessee, the
lessor to be advised and notified in a certain manner.
8 Ill, App. 3d at 209, 289 N.E.2d at 699.
105. 54 Ill. 2d 14, 294 N.E.2d 262 (1973).
106. Id. at 15, 294 N.E.2d at 263.
107. Id.
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writing, imprecise language can cause considerable delays, expenses
and risks to clients.
In another supreme court decision, Tatar v. Maxon Construction

Co.,'

the meaning of an indemnity clause in a contract between

a subcontractor and general contractor was at issue.

The plaintiff,

Tatar, was an employee of Freesen Brothers, a subcontractor for
grading and leveling work. He was injured when a wooden beam
fell on him, allegedly caused by the negligence of employees of
Maxon, the general contractor. Tatar sued Maxon and Maxon sub-

sequently filed a third party complaint against Freesen on the basis
of the indemnification clause in the subcontract.

That clause pro-

vided that Freesen would indemnify Maxon
against all expenses, claims, suits, or judgments of every kind whatsoever
• . . by reason of, arising out of, or connected with, accidents, injuries, or
damages, which may occur upon or about the Subcontractor's work. 109

The subcontractor, Freesen, argued that such a clause should be
interpreted to require indemnification only for the negligence of the
subcontractor or persons other than the general contractor. The
supreme court accepted this position, relying on a 1947 Illinois case
which stated:
It is quite generally held that an indemnity contract will not be construed
as indemnifying one against his own negligence, unless such a construction
is required by clear and explicit language of the contract, or such intention
is expressed in unequivocal terms. 110

Not finding anything in the subcontract to offset this narrow construction the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the third party
complaint against Freesen, and required the general contractor to
defend against Tatar's action alone.
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

In four of the five insurance cases selected for this survey, insurance companies fared poorly either because of their own delays in
acting or because of courts' willingness to "re-write" policies. in
McMahon v. Coronet Insurance Co."' the Appellate Court First
108.
109.
110.
Ill. 429,
111.

54 Ill. 2d 64, 294 N.E.2d 272 (1973).
Id. at 66, 294 N.E.2d at 273.
Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg. Corp., 395
433, 70 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1947).
6 Ill. App. 3d 704, 286 N.E.2d 631 (1972).
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District, First Division found that the company had waived the requirement of a sworn statement from an insured within 30 days
after an accident, and the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
with arbitration of their case. The policy holders had failed to give
the requisite statement at any time during the two years following
the accident, although they did notify the company in a number
of less formal ways. Within several days of the accident, for example, the plaintiffs made a telephone report to the company. Also,
a comprehensive report was sent to the company on its own forms and
statements were given to a company representative who visited plaintiffs at their home. The insurance company never indicated it was
seeking formal notice until the time of trial. The court held that
such conduct created in the plaintiffs a reasonable belief that it was
unnecessary for them to comply with the strict requirements of the
policy. "This provision was placed in the policy for the benefit of
Coronet," the court noted, "[t]herefore, it was within the power
of Coronet to waive its right to receive such formal statement.""' 2
The second case in which an insurance company's delay was
costly was Talbot v. Country Life Insurance Co.," 3 a case decided
this year by the Third District Appellate Court. The company took
five months to pass on an application for a life insurance policy.
Within that time, the applicant died and the company thereafter returned the premium he had paid with its rejection of the application. The court held against the company even though it admitted
there was no basis for an action in contract.
mhe application, being a mere offer or proposal for a contract of insurance, is not a contract. The existence of a contractual relationship between the parties (absent a binder) depends upon the acceptance by the
114
insurer of the application.

The court chose to base recovery on a negligence theory, finding
a legal obligation on the part of an agent or insurer to act with
reasonable promptness on an application by providing either the requested coverage or by notifying the applicant of its rejection.
The court, however, hinted it might have been equally receptive to
a complaint based on promissory estoppel. Although not mentioning such doctrine by name, it pointed to the fact that between the
112. Id. at 709, 286 N.E.2d at 634.
113. 8 Ill.
App. 3d 1062, 291 N.E.2d 830 (1973).
114. id. at 1063, 291 N.E.2d at 831.
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time of application and death, the applicant was in good health and
would have obtained a policy from another company had it not been
for the representations made by the defendant insurance company.
In Burgo v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co." 5 a one year time
limitation in a liability policy was declared void as against public
policy by a divided appellate court. 116 The insurance contract required that if an insured was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist he had one year either to file suit against such motorist or to institute arbitration proceedings. The plaintiffs took the
latter course, but not until seventeen months after the date of their
accident with an uninsured motorist. During that time, they made
several unsuccessful attempts to settle their claim with the defendant
insurance company. The company refused to submit the claim to
arbitration because the plaintiffs' demand was made after the one
year time limit.
Speaking for the majority of the court, Judge Dieringer declared
the one year limitation in the policy to be a clever device by the
company to defeat the purpose of the state's uninsured motorist
statute,'" which was enacted to assure policyholders that they would
be treated equally by their insurance company whether they were
involved in an accident with an insured or uninsured motorist. Under the Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury actions,"' the
plaintiffs would have had two years in which to file suit; therefore
the contractual restriction of one year diminished their rights. Judge
Dieringer then went even further by saying the time limit for suits
against uninsured motorists should not be governed by the ordinary personal injury rule, but by the statute of limitations for contract actions, which for written contracts in Illinois is ten years."'
Even if the majority of the court had not chosen to make such
a frontal attack on the one year policy provision, it still probably
115. 8 111. App. 3d 259, 290 N.E.2d 371 (1972). See Kirkland, Casualty Insurance, 23 DEPAuL L. REv. 18 (1973).
116. Judge Adesko of the First District, Fourth Division concurred with Presiding Judge Dieringer's opinion while the court's third member, Judge Burman,
wrote a dissenting opinion, a rarity in the Illinois appellate courts.
117. ILL. Ruv. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.1a (1969).
118. The statute sets the limit at two years from the time the cause of action
accrues. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1969).
119. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 17 (1969).
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would have found for the plaintiffs on the basis of the settlement
attempts made during the year following the accident.
Courts have held that settlement negotiations toll the running of time limitations, even statutes of limitations, because the plaintiff cannot be lulled
into a sense of security and then be barred from proceeding with a law20
suit when the negotiations fail.'

In a well written dissenting opinion, Judge Burman found nothing
objectionable in the one year limitation contained in the policy and
argued for a rule of law which would require strict adherence to
the conditions set out in an insurance policy, particuarly when those
conditions are phrased in unambiguous language. 121 Stressing the
fact that no time limit was written into the Uninsured Motorist
Act,' 2' Judge Burman stated that "[i]f conditions such as the ones
in the present case are thought to be against the public policy of
this State, such a determination should be made by the legislature
23
and not this court."'
The most questionable decision against an insurance company was
24
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hanson1
in which
a court reformed an unambiguous liability policy in accordance with
an insured's four year old recollection of events surrounding the purchase of the policy. The insured, Cheryl Hanson, was involved in
an auto accident in which her sister Connie, a passenger, was injured. Cheryl's State Farm policy contained the following exclusionary clause, commonly known as a "household exclusion":
This insurance does not apply under:
(i) coverage A, to bodily injury to the insured or any member of the
family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured .... 125
120. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 263, 290 N.E.2d at 374.
121. Judge Burman wrote:
It is a well established rule that the court has the duty to enforce contracts
as made by the parties thereto and not to rewrite the unambiguous terms
agreed upon. The court cannot make for the parties better agreements
than they themselves have been satisfied to conclude. . . . In the
present case there is no claim that the language of the condition precedent
is ambiguous, doubtful or unclear. There is also no contention that the
insurer waived the time limitation or that the insured misapprehended the
terms of the agreement.
8 Ill.
App. 3d at 264, 290 N.E.2d at 375.
122. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1969).
123. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 290 N.E.2d at 376.
124. 7 Ill.
App. 3d 678, 288 N.E.2d 523 (1972).
125. Id. at 679, 288 N.E.2d at 525.
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Despite this clause, the injured sister filed suit against Cheryl, ap-

parently hoping a court would rewrite the policy by deleting the
household exclusion. The only basis for such hope was Cheryl's
uncorroborated testimony that when she purchased the policy four
years ago, her agent assured her that her coverage would encompass
injuries to her brothers and sisters. She even admitted on cross examination that she read the policy, specifically the exclusion clause,
at the time of purchase, but that she did not understand all of what
she had read. Furthermore, the agent who sold her the policy
contradicted her testimony. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded
that a mutual mistake of fact had been made the inception of the
contract, necessitating a reformation of the policy with the household
exclusion clause being deleted. The Fourth District appellate Court
appeared ready to reverse the decision, as it stated in the opinion
by Judge Simkins:
We are mindful of the fact that one family member has sued another and
then both have sought to reform an insurance contract to afford coverage
for the initial lawsuit. The circumstances are, to say the least, suspect. 126

Surprisingly, however, the court affirmed the lower court's decision
on the ground that it could not declare the decision to be contrary

to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Hanson decision must have caused insurance companies to

wonder what they had to do to receive a favorable decision from
the Illinois courts. Their concern was short-lived because a month
after Hanson was decided the Illinois Supreme Court rendered a fav-

orable interpretation of an exclusionary clause in a tenant's liability
policy, allowing the defendant insurance company to avoid paying
on the policy. 2 ' In that case, however, there was a dissenting opin-

ion by Justice Goldenhersh which appears to reflect growing judicial
dissatsifaction with insurance policies:
126. Id. at 685, 288 N.E.2d at 529.
127. See Cobbins v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 53 Ill. 2d 285,
290 N.E.2d 873 (1972), a case involving the interpretation of an owners landlord
tenant liability policy. The insured store owner sold fireworks to an eleven year
old boy in violation of a statute. The boy was injured by the fireworks at his home.
The store owner had purchased coverage for premises-operations hazard but not for
products-completed operations hazard, as defined in the policy. While it was contended that the premises-operation clause should apply because the "cause" of the
injury-the illegal sale-took place in the store, the supreme court found it not
to apply because the actual injury did not occur until after the boy left the store.
Therefore, it concluded that the insurance company did not have to defend the suit
brought by the injured boy.
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It has been said facetiously of insurance policies 'The front page giveth
but the back page taketh away'.

. .

. Ambiguity and incomprehensibility

seem to be the favorite tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies.
. . . It seems that insurers generally are attempting to convince the customer when selling the policy that everything is covered and convince the
court when a claim is made that nothing is covered. The miracle of it
all is that the English language can be subjected to such abuse and still
remain an instrument of communication .... 128
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE AT A DISTANCE

While the rules for when and where an acceptance becomes effec-

tive are still very much alive in contracts classrooms, they are seldom
debated any more in practice. The case of Nationwide Commercial
Co. v. Knox, 29 however, is an exception. The defendants, located
in Ohio, contracted to buy certain equipment from a corporation located in Illinois. They received in the mail at their home an agreement which they signed and mailed in Ohio. After failing to pay
for the goods, they had a judgment confessed against them by seller's

assignee in the Circuit Court of Cook County. They filed a special
appearance challenging the court's jurisdiction over them contending
that the contract was not made in Illinois. If these had been the
only facts, the buyers would have been correct since acceptance by
80
an authorized means is effective when and where it is sent.'
Acceptance in this case was sent in Ohio by an authorized means,
the same method used to transmit the offer. However, one crucial
fact was missing. The Illinois seller very conspicuously placed the
following language on the document sent to the buyers:
This contract shall not be binding upon seller or become effective until
and unless accepted on behalf of seller by seller's president, vice president
8
or treasurer in writing at Chicago, Illinois.' '
128. 53 Ill. 2d at 295, 290 N.E.2d at 879, quoting from Judge Biegelmeier's
opinion in Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bechard, 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W.2d 86
(1963) and from Judge Osborne's opinion in Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1970).
129. 10 Ill. App. 3d 13, 293 N.E.2d 638 (1973).
130. See line of cases beginning with Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681,
106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818), including Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 S.2d 889 (Fla.
1963) and Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958). See also, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 64 (1932) and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) and A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78 (1952).

131.

10 Ill. App. 3d at 14, 293 N.E.2d at 639.
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Such explicit language underscoring exactly when and where the acceptance was to become operative takes precedence over the "mailbox rules" stemming from Adams v. Lindsell.1 2 In effect, what
the buyers sent from Ohio was not an acceptance, as they argued,
but an offer. Acceptance took place in Chicago when the seller
signed the document. Thus, since acceptance was the last event necessary in the formation of the contract, the Fourth Division of the
Appellate Court's First District correctly held that the contract was
"made" in Illinois, thereby giving Illinois courts jurisdiction over the
Ohio defendants.
INCAPACITY:

MINORS' CONTRACTS

Although the legislature recently lowered the age of majority in
Illinois, 3 3 two appellate courts have indicated that the special status
which the law has granted minors has been compromised in no other
way. In Logan County Bank v. Taylor'1 4 the defendant, a minor,
claimed that his act of telling the creditor-bank to come and get
his car amounted to a disaffirmance of a contract that he had with
the bank. The bank had given the youth money to purchase the
car in return for a promissory note from him. After he made two
payments on the note, he told the bank to pick up the car because
he had been drafted into military service. The bank did so, then
sold the car for salvage ($30) and obtained a confessed judgment
against the boy for the balance of the purchase price. The bank
made three arguments in support of the judgment; first, that the
boy's direction to pick up the car was not an act of disaffirmance;
second, that even if it were, it was ineffective because it was made
while the defendant was still a minor; and third, that the defendant
"reaffirmed" the contract after returning from the service by telling
the bank that he would pay off the debt. 13 5 The Fourth District
132. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); see also the cases cited
in note 130 supra and Holland v. Riverside Park Estates, Inc., 214 Ga. 244,
104 S.E.2d 83 (1958); Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Gehring, 283 Ill. App.
581 (1936), Hill v. Gulf Oil Corp., 200 Va. 287, 105 S.E.2d 625 (1958) and
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONRESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 61 (1932)
TRACTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 131 (1971) reads: "Persons of the age of 18
shall be considered of legal age for all purposes except that of the Illinois Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, and until this age is attained, they shall be considered minors."
134. 11111. App. 3d 120, 295 N.E.2d 743 (1973).
135. The facts indicate that the youth's subsequent "reaffirmance" was made
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First, it said that

the question of whether there was a disaffirmance was one of intent,
and that the defendant's contacting the bank and telling them to

pick up the car was an unequivocal renunciation of the contract.
True, he could have sent them a letter, registered mail, telling them just
that, and maybe such could be characterized as "more unequivocal," but
there is no requirement for the nth degree of unequivocalness.' 3 6

Second, the court held that a minor's disaffirmance of a contract
can be made during his minority just as easily as if he waits until
he reaches his majority. 1 7 Finally, the court said there is no such
thing as a "reaffirmance" of a contract which already has been disaffirmed because "Reaffirmance cannot be premised on an effort to

reverse that which has been legally avoided."""
In Logan Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Davis"' two minors who were
planning to be married wanted to purchase household furniture from
the plaintiff's store. They were told they needed the signature
of an adult on the retail installment contract. Upon obtaining such
a signature, they received the furniture. After making payments
for more than a year, the couple defaulted and the store obtained

a confession of judgment against them both as well as against the
adult who signed the contract for them. A lower court issued an
order upholding the judgment against the minors, apparently on the
basis that the furniture they bought (which included a television

set) constituted necessaries and thus was an exception to the rules
on incapacity. The First District, Second Division Appellate Court
did not decide whether the items of furniture were necessaries, but

concluded that in either event, the minors should not be held responsible for payment because the sale to them was not made on
their own credit.
To recover from a minor for the reasonable value of necessaries furnished
them, it is essential that they shall have been furnished on his credit.
after the bank gave him some inaccurate legal advice:
[t]he bank called defendant in and demanded payment. Defendant advised them that he was a minor at the time the loan was executed, but
was told in return that such fact was of no consequence, and he thereupon
agreed to make payments of $10 or $15 a month-which he never did.
11 Ill. App. 3d at 121, 295 N.E.2d at 743.
136. Id. at 121, 295 N.E.2d at 744.
137. ld.
138. ld. at 122, 295 N.E.2d at 744.
139. 8 Ill.
App. 3d 150, 289 N.E.2d 228 (1972).
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. ..
In this record, it plainly appears that when appellee on July 2,
1968 extended credit for the sale of its furniture, it did not do it solely
40
on the credit of appellants who were minors.1
ILLEGALITY:

NO CONTINGENCY FEE FOR DIVORCE

In Stoller v. Onuszko1 4 1 an attorney unsuccessfully attempted to
collect a contingency fee for a divorce case. The First District,
Third Division Appellate Court reaffirmed a 1958 Illinois case, In
re Fisher'4 2 and held that "[i]t is against public policy for attorneys
to enter into contingent fee contracts in divorce actions."' 4 8 The
attorney argued that because he was wrongfully discharged by his
client, the case should be governed instead by Warner v. Basten,'"
a 1969 case which approved the enforcement of an attorney's lien
in an amount equal to twenty five per cent of the settlement. The
Stoller court, however, pointed to the fact that Warner was a personal injury action and not a divorce action. Alternatively the plaintiff argued that the 1965 case of Zagar v. Zagar145 should control
since in that case an attorney was allowed to recover a fifty per
cent contingency fee in a divorce-related case. The court again
found a distinction, noting that Zagar involved a contract to collect
arrearages under a separate maintenace decree and not a contract
to represent someone who wished to obtain a divorce. The court
further said that the Attorney's Lien Act 46 could not support the
plaintiff's position since the contract on which he based his purported lien was void and unenforceable. "We will not enforce an
"predicated on an invalid or unlawful
attorney's lien," said the court,
47
contract of employment."'
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES

Third party beneficiary law was the basis for the appeal in Viny140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 152-53, 289 N.E.2d at 230.
10 Ill. App. 3d 598, 295 N.E.2d 118 (1973).
15 Ill. 2d 139, 153 N.E.2d 832 (1958).
10 11. App. 3d 599-600, 289 N.E.2d at 119.
118 Ill. App. 2d 419, 255 N.E.2d 72 (1969).
56 Ill. App. 2d 175, 205 N.E.2d 754 (1965).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13 § 14 (1967) (this provision remains unchanged in

the 1971 code).
147.

10 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 295 N.E.2d at 120.
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last Corp. v. Gordon,148 a case decided this year by the First Dis-

trict, Fifth Division Appellate Court. Vinylast was a creditor of
A1-Fab Corporation, a storm window manufacturer, which in 1967
became unable to pay his debts.

At that time, A1-Fab entered into

an agreement with some of its other creditors-excluding Vinylastin which it agreed to take steps to avoid bankruptcy in exchange
for a one year extention for payment of its debts. Vinylast contended that it was a third party beneficiary of the creditors' agreement, and thus could sue the creditors who signed it.

Vinylast

pointed to several facts indicating the agreement was intended for
its benefit. 149 The appellate court agreed that third parties may
enforce agreements entered into for their benefit and that the creditors' agreement may have been made for Vinylast's benefit. Nevertheless the court affirmed a motion to dismiss Vinylast's complaint
because it had sued the wrong party.
The remedy of a third party beneficiary lies against the party to the contract who is required to supply his benefits. In the instant case, although
the creditors through their committee were to provide supervision, A1-Fab
was to provide the benefits to plaintiff. Thus, Al-Fab was the proper defendant to an action on a third party beneficiary contract; but Al-Fab
was not joined as a defendant in the instant case. 150

The court reveals by the above statement that it still embraces the

Restatement I5 view of third party beneficiaries rights. That view
distinguishes between beneficiaries clasified as either donees or
creditors, allowing the former to sue only the promisor, while allowing the latter to sue both promisor and promisee. Restatement I1152
does not make such a distinction, and treats both types of beneficiaries as intended, thus giving both the same rights.
148. 10 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 295 N.E.2d 523 (1973).
149. In the agreement Al-Fab agreed (1) to establish a sinking fund to be
administered by the creditors' committee for the payment of all creditors of
the amounts owed prior to the execution of the agreement, (2) to give
priority under the supervision of the creditors' committee to the normal
operation of the business including payments for the purchase of new
goods following the execution of the agreement, and (3) to give no liens
without the consent of the creditors' committee.
Id. at 1049, 295 N.E.2d at 528.
150. Id.
151. RESTATEMENT OF CO NTRACTS §§ 133, 141 (1932).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 141 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1972).

1973]

CONTRACTS--SALES

213

REMEDIES

Several important appeals were decided this year involving contractual remedies. In the only federal court case appearing in this
survey, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the seldom
used remedy of quasi-contract'
in reversing a district court decision. In P.S. & E. Inc. v. Selastomer Detroit, Inc.,'" a diversity
case, the plaintiff alleged a breach of an exclusive agency contract
made in 1965. After entering the contract, the plaintiff claimed
it had hired additional personnel and expended considerable effort
and money in order to promote the defendant's product, a new type
of packing device. The defendant, however, terminated the agreement and began invading the same market claimed by the plaintiff.
The defendant sought a summary judgment on the ground that the
agreement was terminable at the will of either party, and that its
termination therefore was not a breach of contract. The district
court granted the motion because the absence of a duration term
from the contract was not disputed by the plaintiff.' 5 5 The circuit
court first agreed that under Illinois law a contract which fails to
fix a time for its duration and calls for continual performance is
ordinarily terminable at will. 15 6 However, the court did not agree
that that should be the end of the matter. It felt that the plaintiff
should be compensated for the expense, time and labor devoted in
good faith for the defendant's benefit. In an opinion by Judge
Sprecher, the court noted that Illinois courts have recognized quasicontractual relief when one unjustly enriches himself at the expense
of another. 5 7 Quoting from a similar 1947 diversity case decided
in the same circuit, 1 58 the court stated that
[t]he law will not permit one thus to deprive another of value without
awarding just compensation. The just principle acted upon by the courts
153.

See

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 355 (1932).

154. 470 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1972).
155. Id. at 127.
156. Id. at 127-28, relying on Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing
Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912) and Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
103 Ill. App. 2d 197, 243 N.E.2d 31 (1968).

157.

470 F.2d at 129, citing United States v. 0. Frank Heinz Constr. Co.,

300 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Ill. 1969) and Beatrice Foods Co. v. Gallagher, 47 Ill.
App. 2d 9, 197 N.E.2d 274 (1964).
158. Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 161 F.2d 811, 813 (7th
Cir. 1947).
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in the circumstances suggested requires no more than that, in every instance,
the agent shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to avail himself of
the primary expenditures and efforts put forth to the end of executing the
authority conferred upon him and that, if such opportunity is denied him,
the principal shall compensate him accordingly. 159

Quasi-contractual relief was also granted by a state appellate
court last year in Comm v. Goodman,160 a case in which an architect
tried to collect from a real estate developer for services rendered
without a contract. The two parties first performed under a contract

for work on a preliminary plan for an apartment project.

Then

the plaintiff went on to do other work, such as determining expected

gross revenues, expenses and profits for such apartment project, but
could not later establish a contract for doing this extra work. 6 ' Nevertheless, the trial court found that the defendant knew that the
plaintiff rendered the additional services and that the defendant ac-

cepted the benefit of said services. Thus, the defendant was made
to pay for their reasonable value. On appeal, the defendant argued
that circumstances existed indicating that the developmental services
were not rendered with the expectation of payment, and therefore
could not have been the basis of quantum meruit relief. The defendant cited a 1964 case, McRoberts v. Estate of Kennelly, 1 2 in

support of its proposition. The First District, Fifth Division Appellate Court noted that factors existing in McRoberts-course of
dealing, family relationship or long standing friendship--did not exist in Comm and so no inference of gratuitousness could have been

supported by the evidence. In affirming the decision for the plaintiff, the court gave a brief review of the concept of quasi-contract:
A contract implied in law is equitable in its nature and is one which reason
and justice dictate. It does not arise from an intent to contract or a promise
to pay. It exists where there is a plain duty and a consideration. The
consideration may be a parting with something by the party seeking to enforce the contract; the promise is presumed so that there will not be a
failure of justice. Its essential element is the receipt of a benefit by one
party which would be inequitable for that party to retain. It is predicated
159. 470 F.2d at 128. The Fargo court had in turn quoted from Beebe v.
Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 117 S.W.2d 624, 629 (1938).
160. 6 Ill. App. 3d 844, 286 N.E.2d 758 (1972).
161. The trial judge found the plaintiff's evidence to have been inadequate for
the purpose of establishing the existence of a second contract, and the appellate
court would not question this factual finding, 6 Il1. App. 3d at 852-53, 286 N.E.2d
at 762-63.
162. 52 111. App. 2d 34, 201 N.E.2d 680 (1964).
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on the fundamental principle that no one should unjustly enrich himself
63
at another's expense.1

In Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck'6 4 the First District, First

Division Appellate Court found a circuit court to have been overly
imaginative in its efforts to salvage an unreasonably restrictive employment covenant. In 1967, the defendant, while still an employee,

signed an agreement in which he promised to refrain from divulging
trade secrets, customer lists or any other confidential information,
and also to refrain from competing, either directly or indirectly, with
his employer for two years after the termination of his employment.
The geographic restriction of competition was a 100 mile radius

around each of nineteen major American cities in which his employer was then doing business.

The plaintiff supplied data process-

ing services and temporary office help to companies in those cities.
The defendant was terminated in 1971 and, in violation of the nega-

tive covenant contained in his employment contract, organized his
own business which competed with the plaintiff in Chicago. The
plaintiff sought and obtained an injunction against the defendant,
but the circuit court modified the geographical restriction on defendant's activities to an area equivalent to a twenty-five mile radius of
Chicago.' 65 The appellate court found the covenant to be an unreasonable restraint on trade and refused to enforce it, even in its modi-

fied form. While admitting there was a split of authority as to
whether a court could properly modify an unreasonably restrictive
covenant,' 66 the court cited several Illinois cases161 and one federal
case 6 8 which prevented such attempts at modification. The court
went on to state:
We, therefore, are in accord with the established weight of authority in
Illinois when we hold that the attempted restriction upon the employee in
163. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 854, 286 N.E.2d at 763.
164. 10 Ill. App. 3d 50, 293 N.E.2d 900 (1973).
165. Id. at 52, 293 N.E.2d at 901-02.
166. Basically, it appears that there is some division in legal thought regarding solution of this problem. Some courts have modified and then enforced negative covenants which restrain competition. Other courts will do
so only in cases involving protection of goodwill in sale of a business, secret
processes or trade secrets.
Id. at 53, 293 N.E.2d at 902.
167. House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37 Ill. 2d 32, 225 N.E.2d 21 (1967);
Barrington Trucking Co. v. Casey, 117 I11.App. 2d 151, 253 N.E.2d 36 (1969);
L.&R. Agency, Inc. v. McPhail, 92 111. App. 2d 107, 235 N.E.2d 153 (1968).
168. Central Specialties Co. v. Schaefer, 318 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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the case at bar, being manifestly unreasonable in its inception, was unenforceable and cannot be given legal life by an attempted partial enforcement .... 169

The case is one of hundreds in which employers have sought too
much protection when they drafted restrictive covenants in employment contracts, and consequently wound up with no protection at
all.

170

Welch v. Brunswick Corp.,171 decided this year by the First District, Fourth Division Appellate Court, could serve as a textbook
review of remedies available to contracting parties. The buyers of
bowling equipment filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights,
rescission of contract, injunction to maintain the status quo (allowing them to retain possession of the equipment), and damages for
fraud and breach of warranty. The seller, Brunswick, filed its own
complaint seeking replevin of the bowling equipment in the buyers'
possession and damages for breach of the installment sales contract
for the purchase of the equipment. In deciding for the seller, the
appellate court concentrated on the rescission and replevin aspects
of the two complaints. The court noted that in Illinois, several elements must be shown before a court will rescind a contract on the
basis of fraud. There must first be a misrepresentation of a material
fact; such a misrepresentation must be made for the purpose of inducing action; the misrepresentation must be known to be false by
the party making it or at least not reasonably believed by him to
be true; it must be reasonably believed by the party17 to whom it
is made; and, it must be acted on to that party's damage.
There was conflicting evidence in Welch as to whether all these
elements existed but the court refused to question the trial court's
conclusions in favor of the seller.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the evidence is in conflict as to
many pivotal questions of fact, especially as to the cause of the plaintiffs'
damages and whether they relied upon the representations made by Bruns169. 10 I11.App. 3d at 54, 293 N.E.2d at 903.
170. See, e.g., Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 256, 108 A. 541,
544 (1919) where the court said: "Covenantees [in contracts between employer and
employee] desiring the maximum protection have, no doubt, a difficult task.
When they fail, it is commonly because, like the dog in the fable, they grasp too
much and so lose all."
171. 10 111. App. 3d 693, 294 N.E.2d 729 (1973).
172. Id. at 698, 294 N.E.2d at 732.
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.wick. It was the task of the trial judge to resolve these questions. In the
'Present case, the proceedings took place over a period of several months.
The trial judge observed the witnesses, heard the testimony, viewed the
exhibits and made careful and complete findings of fact. In such cases
the judgment will be affirmed if there is any evidence in the record to
support it and will be reversed only if against the manifest weight of evi3
dence.17

As to the seller's action for replevin, the court found that all the
procedural steps under the Illinois Replevin Act 174 had been properly followed and that Brunswick was entitled to possession of the
bowling equipment. The last issue discussed pertained to the amount
of damages Brunswick should have been awarded for the buyers'
wrongful detention of the equipment. Brunswick offered evidence
of damages on two theories-one based on the value the equipment
would have had if it were available for lease to other operators,
and the other based on the amount by which the equipment depreciated in value during the period of its detention by the plaintiffs.
The trial court chose to apply the depreciation theory and the appellate court found that decision to be correct. 175 In determining the
depreciation value, the trial court considered the fifteen year life expectancy of the equipment and arrived at a figure of over $157,000.
The appellate court reversed this aspect of the decision and limited
the damages to $74,000, Brunswick's valuation of the equipment
in its writ of replevin. "[W]e believe that to permit Brunswick
to recover damages in excess of the value stated by it in its affidavit
would work a serious injustice.' 76 The court reasoned that Brunswick was in the superior position to evaluate the equipment sold
to the plaintiffs when it filed its writ.
The Third District Appellate Court had no difficulty in rescinding
a contract on the basis of a material breach in Siemans v. Thompson.177 The contract provided that the plaintiff would purchase
forty-nine percent of the defendant corporation at a cost of $49,000
and would work at a salary of not less than $1,000 a month. After
plaintiff worked a year under the contract, the corporation's cash
position became so weak that the plaintiffs salary had to be
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 700, 294 N.E.2d at 734.
ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 19, 23 (1971).
10 111. App. 3d at 701, 294 N.E.2d at 735.
10 Ill. App. 3d at 703, 294 N.E.2d at 736.
11 Ill.
App. 3d 856, 297 N.E.2d 241 (1973).
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stopped. In allowing the plaintiff to rescind the entire contract, the
court found the cessation of salary to be a substantial breach and
stated that "[a]ccording to the rule in Illinois, when there is a substantial breach by one party to a contract the other party has the right
178
to rescind the contract and to be restored to his former status.'
The First District, Second Division Appellate Court had an opportunity to render an opinion which could have eventually been incorporated into contracts casebooks to illustrate the principles of consideration and promissory estoppel. Instead, the court chose to resolve the case on rules involving specific performance of contracts.
The classic fact pattern found in Pesovic v. Pesovic t9 involved a
father sending letters to his son in Greece urging the son to come
with his family to the United States. The letters contained the following language, so reminescent of questions appearing in law
school exams:
[Wihen you come to me I will dress up and shoe you and your family.
I promise you that I will buy everything you and your family need ...

(You) will have (your) own home.' 8 0

Prompted by these urgings, the son brought his family to this country and within a short time was given possession of a house owned
by the father. However a serious family feud developed which could
not be resolved outside of court. The father brought an ejectment
action against the son and the son retaliated by demanding undisturbed ownership of the house. The court could have asked
whether the son's coming to America was the quid pro quo for the
father's promise of the house or whether it was merely a condition
precedent to the father's making a gift of the house. Perhaps the
court could have asked whether the son's coming to America
amounted to a substantial detriment in reliance on the father's promise, estopping the father from dishonoring the promise. The court,
however, chose to by-pass both questions and instead held for the
father on the basis that a land contract needs to be definite and
certain before it will be specifically enforced.
Specific performance of a contract to convey land requires one that is
unambiguous, complete in its terms and clearly proven. .

178. Id. at 859, 297 N.E.2d at 243.
179. 10 ill. App. 3d 708, 295 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
180. Id. at 710, 295 N.E.2d at 263.

.

. [It] must
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point out the land to be conveyed or furnish the means of identifying the
18 1
land with certainty.

The letters sent to the son in Greece did not specify any particular
house owned by the father, and in the opinion of the court, expressed nothing more than the heartfelt desires of a father who
wished that his son would come to this country and improve his
lot in life. The court did imply, however, that if the letters had
been more definite as to the promised property, an enforceable contract would have been created.
181.

Id. at 711, 295 N.E.2d at 264.

